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All marriages end. When a marriage ends because of death, the surviving
spouse typically is a woman. Also typically, provisions for her continued
support are inadequate. When a marriage ends in divorce, the female partner
usually must find some way of supporting herself. Even when the marriage
does not end, disability of a husband or inflation and familial needs
sometimes make it imperative that a wife return to work. In all these cases,
older women without recent experience in the labor force traditionally have
found it difficult to qualify for any except the most menial jobs.I A federal
district court recently decreed that use of a "recency factor" in evaluating a
woman's qualifications for a position has a discriminatory impact on older
women possibly constituting gender and age discrimination in the absence of
other defenses to such claims. 2
Four circuit courts of appeals 3 have considered the standard of proof to be
used, and all 4 have accepted proof of disparate impact as prima facie evidence
of discrimination in cases involving the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA).5 The United States Supreme Court, with Justice
Rehnquist dissenting, denied certiorari in the only such case to reach it to
date.6 Justice Rehnquist's dissent stated that the Supreme Court had never
found disparate impact to be the proper standard in age discrimination
actions brought under the ADEA. 7 Although Rehnquist's view enjoys support
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from some federal district courts8 and commentators, 9 appellate courts that
have analogized the ADEA to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have
concluded that it is possible to maintain both disparate impact and disparate
treatment cases.' 0 The leading treatise on employment discrimination
supports the appellate court."
Courts have found disparate impact when practices that are neutral with
regard to potentially discriminated classifications (for example, race, age,
gender) nevertheless operate to discriminate against members of the
protected classifications.' 2 In disparate treatment employment discrimination
cases, an employer intends to and does treat members of a protected
classification less favorably than others because of such factors as race, age,
and gender.' 3  Proponents of the disparate-treatment-only doctrine
sometimes employ reasoning suggesting that, because Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 14 the Title VII case initially describing the disparate impact doctrine,
depended on evidence of existing disadvantage caused by prior
discrimination, ADEA cases with no such historical "baggage" are not
analogous. ' 5
This article examines the two doctrines, disparate impact and disparate
treatment, as they relate to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and
tests the theories most commonly set forth in such analyses in the context of
displaced homemakers-a group which only recently has been recognized as a
victim of age discrimination in employment.
The problem of the displaced homemaker above the age of 40 is the same
problem faced by all older workers. The displaced homemaker often is
discriminated against in hiring for a number of age-related reasons. She is
considered too old for training programs. Her benefits will more often than
not cost the employer more than benefits for a younger worker. The number
of years she might serve the employer is limited. Traits such as inflexibility,
lack of stamina, and health problems that could affect any older worker
routinely are attributed to her regardless of her individual circumstances.
The burden of having employers discount skills and experience without
allowing them to be demonstrated and documented affects displaced
homemakers disproportionately. The acceptance of such discounting by the
law and society makes it easy to defend an age discrimination action by citing
"reasonable factors other than age." Unfortunately, none of the existing
8. E.g., Williams v. City & County of San Francisco, 483 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Mastie
v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
9. Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Variations on a
Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L. REV. 621 (1983); Note, Age Discrimination and the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34
STAN. L. REV. 837 (1982).
10. See, e.g., Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1981); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d
1027 (2d Cir. 1980).
11. 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 102.42 (1984).
12. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
13. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
14. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
15. See, e.g., Williams, 483 F. Supp. at 344.
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legislation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age or gender has been
used successfully to attack the problem of the displaced homemaker.
II
ADEA
The ADEA prohibits employment discrimination based on age.16 When
Congress first considered discrimination in the hiring phase of employment,
its concern was for the person who traditionally had been the family's
breadwinner, found himself without a job, and was experiencing difficulty in
finding one because of his age. The effect of unemployment on the
breadwinner and his family is the subject of much of the history of the
ADEA. 17
Attempts to include age as a protected classification in Title VII and
subsequent attempts to amend Title VII to include age proved unsuccessful. '8
Pre-ADEA legislation1 9 and executive acts 20 also were largely inadequate to
combat age discrimination. A report from the Secretary of Labor, mandated
by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, served as the basis for separate passage of the
ADEA. 2 t The purpose of the ADEA legislation was stated in both the House
and Senate Reports recommending its passage:
To promote the employment of older workers based on their ability. This would be
done through an education and information program to assist employers and
employees in meeting employment problems which are real and dispelling those
which are illusory, and through the utilization of informal and formal remedial
procedures.
2 2
Background material for the House and Senate Reports cited the Secretary
of Labor's rejection of new nonstatutory methods for dealing with age
discrimination 23  and President Johnson's message to Congress 24
recommending the ADEA and directing the Secretary of Labor to establish a
comprehensive program of information, counseling, and placement services
for older workers.
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1985).
17. See generally President's Special Message to Congress Proposing Programs for Older
Americans, 1967-I PuB. PAPERS 32 (refers principally to those who have been employed and are no
longer able to retain or regain employment because of age discrimination) [hereinafter Special
Message].
18. H.R. 16972, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. 17383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); seealsoAge
Discrimination in Employment. Hearings on Age Discrimination Bills Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 22, 25 (1967) (statement by Sen. Murphy); id.
at 29 (statement by Sen. Smather).
19. Older Americans Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3055 (1982); Manpower Development and
Training Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-415, 76 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
20. Exec. Order No. 11,141, 3 C.F.R. 112 (1964), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1982).
21. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965) [hereinafter U.S. Dep't of Labor
Report].
22. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967); S. Rep. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1967).
23. H.R. REP., No. 805, supra note 22, at 2; S. REP. No. 723, supra note 22, at 1.
24. Special Message, supra note 17.
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A. Prohibitions
The prohibitory language of the ADEA is almost identical to that of Title
VII.25 Under the ADEA,26 it is unlawful for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.
The Act, amended in 1978, now with few exceptions 27 protects all federal
employees over the age of 40 as well as non-federal employees between the
ages of 40 and 70.28 The ADEA does not prohibit the compulsory retirement
of a bona fide executive or high-level policymaker for the two-year period
immediately before planned retirement if that individual will be entitled to
nonforfeitable annual retirement benefits of at least $54,000.29
B. Defenses
There are five basic defenses to an ADEA action:
(1) when age is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ);30
(2) when the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than
age;31
(3) when the differentiation is necessary to observe the terms of a bona
fide seniority system;32
(4) when the differentiation is necessary to observe a bona fide employee
benefit plan;33 or
(5) when discharge or discipline is for "good cause."'3 4
The BFOQ defense is applicable when age has been made an express
criterion "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business."'35 By its terms, the BFOQ defense applies only in instances of
25. Under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982), it is unlawful
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982).
27. The exceptions to the rule are for firefighters, air traffic controllers, law enforcement
officers, and certain other designated employees. 5 U.S.C. § 8335 (1982).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a), 633a(a) (1982).
29. Id. § 631(c)(1) (1982).
30. Id. § 613(f)(2) (1982).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 623(0(2).
33. Id.
34. Id. § 623(f)(3).
35. Id. § 623(f)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
[Vol. 49: No. 4
THE DISPLACED HOMEMAKER
disparate treatment. Regulations and court decisions provide examples of
circumstances in which this defense is valid, indicating that the criteria must
be reasonably necessary to the "essence" of the business, 36 and that the
employer must have a factual basis for believing that all, or substantially all,
persons within the protected class would be unable to perform the job's
duties safely and efficiently, or that to determine individual ability of persons
over the age limit would be either impossible or impracticable. 37
Unlike the BFOQ defense, the ADEA's provision for differentiation based
on "reasonable factors other than age" seems to apply where there has been
disparate impact as well as where there has been a charge of disparate
treatment. The interpretative guidelines from the Secretary of Labor
describing fact situations that would and would not support a finding of
"reasonable factors" suggest that the test is equivalent to the "business
necessity" or "job relatedness" tests under Title VII.38 Like those defenses,
the "reasonable factors other than age" defense is properly seen as a denial of
the plaintiff's prima facie case and is thus equivalent to an assertion of no
discrimination when the action is based on the disparate treatment doctrine.
Physical fitness requirements, education requirements, and quantity and
quality of production are examples of factors discussed in the interpretative
guidelines .39
The defenses recognizing bona fide seniority systems and employee
benefit plans require that the plan in question not be designed to evade the
purposes of the ADEA.40 The section that permits discharge or discipline of
employees for good cause is similar to the provision allowing differentiation
on "reasonable factors other than age."'4 1
III
DISPARATE IMPACT
Most of the actions brought under the ADEA have been disparate
treatment cases involving white males who have not been hired or who have
been fired from their jobs.42 A few cases have involved combined age and
race or age and gender discrimination claims. 43 In one recent age and
36. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (quoting Diaz v. Pan American World
Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971)); Usery v. Tamiami Trail
Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976).
37. Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977); see also Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400
U.S. 542 (1971).
38. 29 C.F.R. § 860.103 (1985).
39. Id.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1982).
41. Id. § 623(f)(1).
42. See Blumrosen, Book Review, 12 SETON HALL L. REv. 186, 192 (1981) (arguing that
application of the disparate impact theory would slow the progress of affirmative action for
minorities and women since white males in their fifties and sixties are the principal beneficiaries of
the ADEA); see also, cases cited infra note 48 (except Smithers and Smith).
43. Stearns v. Consolidated Management, Inc., 747 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1984); Sweat v. Miller
Brewing Co., 708 F.2d 655 (11 th Cir. 1983); Scharnhorst v. Independent School Dist., 686 F.2d 637
(8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1109 (1983).
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gender-based case 44 and in future challenges to employment decisions
involving displaced homemakers, however, the use of the disparate impact
doctrine may be essential to further the purpose of the ADEA-elimination of
employment discrimination based on illusory rather than real problems. 45
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court held in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 46
that facially neutral employment practices resulting in discriminatory or
disparate impact violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Two years
later, in McDonnell Douglas Co. v. Green,47 the Court set forth the requirements
of a prima facie case of discrimination based on disparate treatment under Title
VII. Nine circuits have decided that the disparate treatment standards
announced in McDonnell Douglas are applicable to an ADEA action.48 Only
four of those circuits, however, have adopted the Griggs disparate impact
doctrine in ADEA actions. 49
Although Lorillard v. Pons50 was concerned with a procedural issue (the
provision of a jury trial in ADEA actions) and declined to follow Title VII's
lead in the matter, courts5' and commentators52 that recognize either
disparate treatment or disparate impact generally cite Lorillard for the
proposition that the substantive prohibitions of the ADEA were "derived in
haec verba from Title VII" and that there are "important similarities" in the
purposes and substantive provisions of the two statutes.53 Courts and
commentators that have not adopted both the disparate impact and the
disparate treatment doctrines have pointed to the different legislative
histories behind Title VII and ADEA, 54 the different natures of age
discrimination and race or religious discrimination, 55 the source of the
disparate impact doctrine, 56 and the language of the ADEA57 as support for
not extending the doctrine to ADEA actions.
44. Haskins v. Secretary of HHS, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 256 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
45. For a discussion of the purpose of the ADEA, see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
46. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
47. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
48. Sutton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1981); Stanojev v. Ebasco Serv., Inc.,
643 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1981); Smith v. University of N.C., 632 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1980); Kephart v.
Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981);
Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892 (3rd Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Sun Oil Co., 605 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir.
1979); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979); Kentroti v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 585
F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1978); Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 574 F.2d 958 (8th Cir. 1978).
49. See Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983); Allison v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir. 1982); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1981);
Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
50. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
51. E.g., Hodgson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan, 455 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1972) ("With a few
minor exceptions, the prohibitions of [ADEA] are in terms identical to those of Title VII . . . except
that 'age' has been substituted for race, color, religion, sex or national origin.").
52. See, e.g., Player, supra note 9, at 623.
53. Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584.
54. E.g., Note, supra note 9, at 844.
55. Id. at 850; Schuck, Age Discrimination Revisited, 57 CHI. [-] KENT L. REV. 1029 (1981); Note,
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380, 383 (1976).
56. E.g., Note, supra note 9, at 848.
57. Id. at 842.
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In a recent case under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,58 the
Supreme Court considered whether disparate impact analysis was permissible
when considering discrimination against the handicapped. 59 The Court
found for the agency charged with discrimination because the impact in
question was not the type that would have been found discriminatory under a
disparate impact analysis. However, the Court did assume, without deciding,
that section 504 reached "at least some conduct that has an unjustifiable
impact upon the handicapped." 60 The Supreme Court's decision supports
reasoning by some federal district courts6 1 that even if disparate impact is an
acceptable theory for analysis of some discrimination cases, there must be a
case-by-case analysis to determine when to apply the doctrine. In the context
of section 504, at least, the Court seems to indicate that the analysis depends
on a balance between giving effect to statutory objectives and administrative
efficiency. 62 If that is the balance to be made in each disparate impact case,
both legislative purpose and procedural requirements need to be examined.
One argument made against adoption of the disparate impact theory in
ADEA cases is that its application would likely prove too unwieldy. A
significant factor would be that ADEA cases, unlike Title VII cases, permit
trial by jury. 6 3 If, however, as is generally accepted in Title VII and ADEA
cases, and assumed in this article, disparate impact either does or does not
apply to a particular statutory scheme (a proposition not supported by the
section 504 case), the case-by-case balance should not be a significant
impediment to its utilization.
A. Legislative History
In a report made in response to a directive contained in the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Secretary of Labor noted that although there were fifty-two
million Americans between the ages of forty and sixty-four, half of all jobs
were closed to workers over fifty-five years of age and one-fourth to workers
over forty-five; among unemployed workers generally, over one-fourth were
forty-five or older and among long-term unemployed, one-half were in that
age category. 64 In addition, the report stated that of the billion dollars in
unemployment insurance paid out each year, three-fourths went to persons
over forty-five. 65  President Johnson, in his message to Congress
recommending the consideration and passage of the ADEA, spoke of
58. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
59. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
60. Id. at 299.
61. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1187 (6th Cir. 1983); Murphy v.
American Motors Sales Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403, 1405 (N.D. Ga. 1976), modified on other grounds, 570
F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1978).
62. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 299.
63. This objection was one made by members of the North Carolina defendants' bar attending
this Law and Contemporary Problems symposium.
64. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR REPORT, supra note 21.
65. Id.
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"[h]undreds of thousands not yet old, not yet voluntarily retired, [who] find
themselves jobless because of arbitrary age discrimination." 66
The severity of the impact due to unemployment on the older worker has
been a concern in ADEA actions as well as in congressional hearings. One
court, in ruling on the availability of damages for pain and suffering in a
termination case, recognized that the psychological and physiological
problems of aging, coupled with arbitrary and illegal discharge, "can take a
dramatic toll." 67 An amicus brief filed by the American Medical Association
discussing mandatory retirement referred to "loss of status, lack of
meaningful activity, fear of becoming dependent, and.., isolation" as factors
impacting the health of older unemployed workers. 68
The Civil Rights Act of 1964,69 on the other hand, was a direct response to
the civil unrest of the early 1960's. Its passage, like the passage of the Voting
Rights Act of 196570 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 71 was a response,
much akin to an apology, for acts of violence by whites in retaliation for
moderate civil rights activity. 72 Unlike discrimination on account of race, the
original object of Title VII-discrimination on account of age-was not
perceived to be a widespread problem. In fact, attempts to include a
prohibition against discrimination on account of age in Title VII failed. 73 The
ADEA, when passed, relied on the enforcement procedures of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.7 4 Whether these differences in the legislative histories of Title
VII and the ADEA justify differing standards of proof is a part of the debate
that is the focus of this article. Whether the different character of
discrimination based on age requires different treatment from that afforded
Title VII plaintiffs is an additional concern.
B. The Nature of Discrimination and the Source of the Disparate
Impact Doctrine
Discrimination against a person on the basis of age is generally not based
on bigotry, but rather on a stereotyping of individuals' abilities based on a
mistaken perception of the abilities of an entire class of older workers.
Attempts to distinguish this type of discrimination from distinctions made
among individuals based on personal prejudice or emotion has led some
courts and writers to conclude that legal responses to the problems should be
66. Special Message, supra note 17, at 37.
67. Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 404 F. Supp. 324, 329 (D.N.J. 1975), vacated on
unrelated grounds, 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
68. Brief for the American Medical Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4, Weisbrod v. Lynn, 383 F.
Supp. 933 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, 420 U.S. 940 (1975).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1447; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1975d, 2000a-2000h-6 (1982).
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb (1982).
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-2619 (1982).
72. A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 11, § 66.44 (citing public reaction to the murder of three
seminary students, the shooting ofJames Meridith, and the murder of Viola Liuzzo as contributing to
the passage of the three Acts).
73. See H.R. 16972, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. 17383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
74. 29 U.S.C. § 626(a) (1982).
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different. 75 Others have characterized Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 76 and its
progeny as focusing on redress for past discrimination, noting its
inapplicability to age, discrimination since ostensibly the present-day older
worker was actually the beneficiary of age discrimination when younger.77
They argue that the disparate impact doctrine is applicable only in instances
that reflect a blend of circumstances-a past history of discrimination, either
by the defendant, the industry, or society, and facially neutral criteria that
serve to perpetuate the effects of that past discrimination. There is little
support for such a limitation either in Griggs or in Title VII disparate impact
cases since Griggs, 78 and there is no such evidentiary requirement in
presenting Title VII claims. Even if one were to concede the impossibility of
lifting the disparate impact doctrine completely from Title VII to overlay the
ADEA without reexamining the different "kinds" of discrimination prohibited
under the two statutes, nothing dictates that past institutional discrimination
be the focus of a reexamination. 79
C. Language of the ADEA
The failure of courts to cite specific sections of the ADEA when adopting a
disparate impact analysis gives rise to one argument against the use of the
disparate impact doctrine in ADEA cases. The claim is that there is some
ambiguity in the statute's language that, although it could be read to allow
disparate impact, provides for only disparate treatment analysis when read
grammatically.80 Such an argument is questionable, particularly when
75. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam); U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 21, at 2, 6; A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 11, at § 66.25; Note, supra
note 55, at 383-88.
76. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
77. Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1045 (1975).
78. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (applying the Griggs disparate impact
analysis to sex discrimination).
79. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-06 (1973), decided two years after
Griggs, the Supreme Court approved the disparate treatment doctrine under Title VII, while
affirming the use of the disparate impact doctrine in Griggs. Language in McDonnell Douglas that
attempts to distinguish the facts of that case from Griggs, thus requiring the use of the disparate
treatment doctrine, could be used to support the argument that the disparate impact doctrine is
applicable only where there is evidence of prior disadvantage "resulting from forces beyond their
[minority's] control." Id. at 806.
80. Noting that Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945
(1981), failed to cite a specific section of the ADEA to support the application of the disparate impact
doctrine, the author in Note, supra note 9, at 842-48, examines ADEA §§ 4(a)(2) and 4(f)(1), seeking
authorization for adoption of the disparate impact doctrine in the express language of those
provisions. That author concludes that because of the ambiguity involved in determining the object
of the modifier "because of such individual's age" in § 4(a)(2), there are at least two interpretations
to be given the clause "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's age." Note, supra note 9, at 842 (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1976)). She further concludes that only one such interpretation is grammatically
correct, the one that supports disparate treatment only. Id. at 843.
To support her interpretation, the author also looks at § 4(a)(l) of the ADEA, a section that she
claims was constructed identically to § 4(a)(2), although the point of the comparison is to show that
there is not such ambiguity in § 4(a)(l), a section that she feels authorizes only disparate treatment
claims. Id. She notes that since § 4(a)(2) addresses only "employees" and § 4(a)(l) addresses
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recognizing that the structure of the pertinent sections of the ADEA were
derived directly from Title VII.81
Another argument that the language of the ADEA forbids the disparate
impact doctrine's adoption suggests that the language of section 4(f)(1),
permitting differentiation "based on reasonable factors other than age,"
actually precludes disparate impact claims.8 2 County of Washington v. Gunther, 83
a Supreme Court opinion interpreting a Title VII amendment barring certain
gender-based wage discrimination claims, is cited as support for this
contention.8 4 That amendment, in effect, would not require equal pay for
equal work under Title VII in all cases. Title VII's failure to provide for an
affirmative defense of a differential based on "factors other than gender,"
while providing for the other affirmative defenses authorized by the Equal Pay
Act, is necessary according to the Court to avoid "significant consequences
for Title VII litigation."8' 5 The argument alleges that since it could be
inferred that equal pay claims were limited to use of the disparate treatment
doctrine, by analogy, section 4(f)(1) was limited in the same manner.86 The
Court's actual language, however, addressed the Equal Pay Act's restriction to
gender discrimination compensation claims as opposed to the entire gamut of
Title VII objects.8 7 Citing Griggs, the Court reiterated the broad scope of
Title VII: "Title VII's prohibition of discriminatory employment practices
was intended to be broadly inclusive, proscribing 'not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation.' "88
"individuals," it would be anomalous to allow a disparate impact claim for everyone except
applicants, the group she alleges are the "most common claimants under the disparate impact
doctrine." Id.
In other words, the claim is that §§ 4(a)(l) and 4(a)(2) are constructed identically, but § 4(a)(1)
does not contain the ambiguity of § 4(a)(2), and, if read correctly, authorizes only disparate
treatment. Further, since § 4(a)(2) applies only to existing employees and § 4(a)(1) applies to
everyone, an anomaly exists: allowance of disparate impact and disparate treatment claims for
existing employees, but only disparate treatment claims for applicants.
The conclusion of the argument about § 4(a)(2)'s lack of specific support for the disparate impact
doctrine cites the lack of legislative history addressing the provision. Id. at 843-44. The author
observes that "[aipparently the provision was simply borrowed verbatim from Title VII," and that
Title VII was not originally intended to authorize disparate impact claims. Id. Such an analysis fails
to acknowledge the Supreme Court's interpretation in Griggs of congressional acceptance of the
disparate impact theory under Title VII. Later in the note, the author discusses the rationale of the
disparate impact doctrine, arguing that Griggs only applies when the discrimination complained of
serves to " 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." Id. at 848 (quoting
Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)). Courts have stated that the language of the ADEA
was derived from Title VII.
81. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 751 (1979); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584
(1978).
82. Note, supra note 9, at 844-48.
83. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
84. Note, supra note 9, at 845.
85. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170 (1981).
86. Such an analysis, contained in Note, supra note 9, at 844-48, though not persuasive for this
author, was repeated by one of the participants in the Law and Contemporary Problems symposium upon
which this issue is based, and it evidently enjoys more than minimal support.
87. 452 U.S. at 181.
88. Id. at 170 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
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IV
DISPARATE TREATMENT VERSUS DISPARATE IMPACT
The disparate treatment doctrine would require plaintiffs to prove that the
discrimination they suffered was purposeful, and not merely the result of
otherwise neutral factors.8 9 The Supreme Court's alleged source for both the
disparate treatment and the disparate impact theories contributes to the
confusion surrounding the question of when the theories should be
employed. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., a case involving employment tests, the
Court, in examining the pertinent section of Title VII, read the statute to
permit disparate impact analysis. 90 Conversely, in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States,9' a seniority case, the Court indicated that the same
section required proof of disparate treatment. Furnco Construction Corp. v.
Waters,92 a Title VII challenge claiming both disparate impact and disparate
treatment, provided the Court an opportunity to set forth the standards for
determining when an action should embrace the disparate treatment doctrine
and when it should employ the disparate impact doctrine. The Court did not
seize its opportunity. Instead, the majority used only a disparate treatment
analysis without an adequate explanation for its choice. Differences in the
defenses available and in the nature of the burden of proof once those
defenses have been raised could cause the standard applied to be significant
in the outcome of the litigation. 93 Adoption of the disparate impact as well as
the disparate treatment doctrine in ADEA cases, therefore, could have a
significant impact on a plaintiff's ability to recover damages.
V
DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS
A "displaced homemaker" is a woman who had been dependent on her
spouse for income, but lost that income through divorce, separation,
desertion, or the disablement or death of her husband. 94 In today's society,
older displaced homemakers are in a unique position because of both sex and
age. They have acceded to societal expectations by devoting their energy to
family-building rather than career-building, but when forced to support
themselves (and frequently their families) they find that their careers as
chauffeurs, nurses, tutors, social secretaries, hostesses, gardners, laundresses,
financial managers, counselors, and general handymen count for naught in
the "real" world. Volunteer activities that may have required complex
89. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
90. 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
91. 431 U.S. 324, 345-47 (1977).
92. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
93. Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice,
34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1231 (1981) (claims that Furnco is notable because the Supreme Court failed
to suggest standards for determining when to apply the disparate impact or the disparate treatment
doctrine).
94. L. SHIELDS, DISPLACED HOMEMAKERS: ORGANIZING FOR A NEW LIFE at ix (1981).
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administrative and organizational skills likewise are not taken into account in
most hiring decisions. The effect on older women who have met traditional
societal expectations in their "prime" years is one of discrimination. Neither
Title VII nor the ADEA as now applied can deal adequately with this
phenomenon.
Congress has not been entirely insensitive to the plight of the displaced
homemaker. Since 1977, at least six bills addressing the issue have been
introduced. 95 The 1978 amendments to the Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act (CETA) provided for job counseling, training and
placement, health education and counseling, financial management services,
educational services, and legal counsel and referral specifically for displaced
homemakers. 96 Unfortunately, the successor to CETA, the Job Training
Partnership Act of 1982, 9 7 established a complicated eligibility system,
seemingly limiting funds available to the displaced homemaker; other
legislation has not afforded any significant relief.
Programs derived from legislation such as CETA that have addressed the
problem of the displaced homemaker have resembled a benign version of
"blame the victim," concentrating on training, financial management services,
job counseling and the like. They have been helpful in that displaced
homemakers have enjoyed resources that before the late 1980's were not
available on any widespread basis or in any systematic way, but they are not
helpful to women who have skills but not jobs. As noted above, the 1982
successor to CETA, the Job Training Partnership Act, has, because of its
implementation system, severely limited even those resources. 98 The
problem of the displaced homemaker will remain for some time to come.
Uncertainties about the future of social security compensation and the
likelihood of continuing inflation further exacerbate the problem.
The older displaced homemaker presents special problems in society. Her
younger counterpart often finds it easier to make the transition to sole
provider for herself and her dependents. Training opportunities available to
younger workers often are not suitable for or available to the older displaced
homemaker. Although some older women have resources such as insurance
payments, social security benefits, alimony, and child support, it is estimated
that 23.6% of all widows live below the poverty level, 99 and fewer than 67.4%
95. H.R. 2090, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 2127, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R.
3554, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 835, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 10272, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 28, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
96. The relevant provisions of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act Amendments
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-524, 92 Stat. 1909, included "displaced homemakers" in the list of special
groups with particular labor market disadvantages, id. § 301 (a)(1), and provided "financial assistance
to conduct programs to provide employment opportunities and appropriate training and supportive
services," id. § 301(b)(l)(A).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 1501 (1982).
98. Smith, JTPA Is Missing Displaced Homemakers and Older Women, in 1985 JoBs WATCH ALERT 3.
99. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SER. P-60, No. 144,
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL: 1982, at 92 (1984) (information
contained in table 21).
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of divorcees receive alimony and child support. 0 0 In addition, persons who
have not recently been employed are not eligible for unemployment
compensation. Women whose husbands have deserted them frequently are
unable to locate either their husbands or their husbands' assets, and women
whose husbands are disabled face increased expenses coupled with decreased
income, more often than not causing severe financial strain.
A displaced homemaker has contributed to the support of her family
through work without compensation or the protections normally
accompanying loss of compensation. Although men are widowed, deserted,
divorced, and left with disabled spouses as well, as a group, they are not
nearly as likely as women to suffer the financial or emotional consequences
accompanying the loss of a partner's income. Four-tenths of one percent of
all men work exclusively as homemakers as opposed to 30.6% of all
women.' 0 l A man is therefore almost 100 times less likely to qualify as a
displaced homemaker than a woman. Since the problem affects women
almost exclusively, it takes on the cloak of a "woman's problem." To the
extent that women suffer employment discrimination because of their
displaced status, it becomes a matter of gender discrimination.
Although fewer women are devoting their years between ages twenty and
forty exclusively to work within the home, approximately ten percent still do
stay home.10 2 Divorces among women over forty have risen from 2.6 million
in 1977 to 3.5 million in 1983.103 The average woman's life expectancy is now
78.2 years compared to the average man's 70.9 years.' 0 4 To the extent older
women suffer employment discrimination because of their displaced status
more than do younger women, the matter has also become one of age
discrimination.
If this society values the choice made by women to remain in the home
rather than to seek outside employment, it implicitly assumes some
responsibility to see that the women who make that choice and who are
subsequently disadvantaged because of it do not suffer for it. Some women
can plan for financial security through adequate insurance or the transfer of
assets during marriage. Many families are unable to do so, however, and no
matter how much planning they do, it will often be necessary for the woman
to seek employment if she suddenly finds herself responsible for her own
support and the support of dependents. Existing legislation and common law
100. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-23, No. 124, CHILD
SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1981 (ADVANCE REPORT), at 2 (1983) (table A). Only 43.5% receive the full
amount awarded. Id.
101. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 31 Employment and Earnings, No. 1, at 196
(1984) (table 35).
102. Id. at 9 (table A-4). In December, 1984, of the 93,164,000 employable women (civilian/non-
institutional) 16 years and older, 9,651,000 of those 39 years and under considered themselves to be
not in the labor force because of "housekeeping duties."
103. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 323, MARITAL
STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1977, at 7 (1978) (information contained in table 1).
104. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, ADVANCE REPORT OF MORTALITY STATISTICS, No.
9 & SUPP., ADVANCE REPORT OF MORTALITY STATISTICS: 1982 at II (1984) (table 3).
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theories have been unhelpful; women have faced discrimination because after
choosing to work in the home, they have encountered employers who have
disregarded the skills gained from that experience.
Use of legal theories has stymied the displaced homemaker. One such
theory, for example, requires that once a plaintiff has shown a prima facie case
of discrimination, the defendant-employer has the opportunity to prove some
legitimate business reason for the failure to hire. The reason most often cited
for failure to hire the woman who has not been in the workplace for fifteen to
twenty years is lack of recent experience, a job requirement regarded as valid
by society. The task confronting displaced homemakers, then, is the
development of evidence that they possess the requisite skills and experience
for jobs as well as evidence that employers' refusal to hire on the basis of lack
of experience is pretextual or not job-related.
Displaced homemakers have received attention in this article and
elsewhere because they are a discrete group with definite traits: they cannot
easily be held to have made truly voluntary choices leading to their depressed
circumstances. In addition, the displaced homemaker, unlike other older
women, has lost financial support that would make her financially secure. The
employment problems facing the displaced homemaker, however, also face
many older women. Statistics show that women are much more likely than
men to interrupt their careers outside the home for care of children or other
family members. Thus, older women are as likely as displaced homemakers to
face the same discrimination when returning to the labor force.
In a recent federal district court opinion, Haskins v. Secretary of HHS, 105 a
woman had been out of the full-time labor force for over fourteen years,
although she was not a displaced homemaker within the generally accepted
meaning of that term. During that fourteen years, she had been a mother, the
wife of a foreign service officer, a volunteer in the Montessori movement, and
a part-time VISTA administrator. She was also a volunteer with a children's
community theater, a neighborhood group, and a university music
conservatory. When she returned to full-time work for the federal
government, her rating was GS-10, as opposed to the GS-13 she held prior to
leaving. Her salary was $1300 a year less than it had been fourteen years
before. After applying and not being hired for a GS-14 position, she filed suit
claiming age and gender discrimination because the employer's use of a
"recency factor" caused the panel rating her application not to consider any
experience more than ten years old.
Plaintiff presented uncontroverted expert testimony that use of a recency
factor discriminates against women since they are more likely than men to
interrupt careers to care for small children, and that it further discriminates
against older women since women who were in their twenties and thirties in
the 1950's and 1960's tended to become homemakers more frequently than
105. 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 256 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
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do their present-day counterparts. 10 6 The court found that the use of the
recency factor discriminated disproportionately against older women and thus
had a disparate impact, both as to gender and as to age. 0 7
Citing Griggs, the court shifted the burden of going forward to the
defendant, who had to show that the recency factor was related to the
performance of the job for which plaintiff applied. It was found that the lack
of consideration of her older "valuable experience" was "arbitrary and
capricious."'' 0 8 Plaintiff thus established a prima facie gender and age
discrimination case. 10 9
Situations encountered by the displaced homemaker are similar to those
faced by the plaintiff in Haskins, but are often decidedly more grim. Although
the opinion in Haskins supports the illegality of discounting older prior paid
experience-a problem for some displaced homemakers-many face the
complete disregard of uncompensated work, and are therefore labeled
unqualified or unskilled. In applying the disparate impact analysis employed
in Haskins to the worst case scenario (a sixty-year-old displaced homemaker
who has never worked outside the home), courts and jurors might reasonably
conclude that this lack of "formal" experience was reasonably related to job
performance and essential to the business. Therefore, even though a court
might find age and gender discrimination, as in Haskins, a potential employer
could rebut the prima facie disparate impact case by showing the relationship
between prior uncompensated experience and the job sought.
A. Disparate Impact and the Displaced Homemaker
As fewer women choose to forgo work outside the home, even while their
children are young, proving disparate impact based on gender discrimination
will be more difficult. The discrimination will nonetheless affect older women
disproportionately. Use of the disparate impact doctrine under the ADEA in
cases where the affected woman is older would seem to be essential to
recovery. The Haskins court accepted the application of the doctrine without
discussion, combining Title VII and the ADEA into one consideration of
"discrimination."' ' Until the Supreme Court makes a more definitive
pronouncement than a denial of certiorari in a disparate impact case, some
courts will struggle with the application of the doctrine in ADEA actions.
Courts that claim to use a case-by-case approach"' when considering the
disparate impact doctrine in age discrimination cases have been unclear about
106. Id. at 257-61.
107. Id. at 262.
108. Id. at 263.
109. Id. at 262.
110. Id. at 263.
111. Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1983); Ackerman v. Diamond
Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66 (6th Cir. 1982); Gabriele v. Chrysler Corp., 573 F.2d 949, 953 (6th Cir.
1978), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 908 (1979); Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 410 F.
Supp. 1403, 1405 (N.D. Ga. 1976), modified on other grounds, 570 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1978); Laugesen
v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1045 (1975).
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the factors considered. One can assume that courts ordinarily examine the
facts of the case in light of the three factors considered in section II above:
the legislative purpose of the ADEA, the nature of the discrimination, and the
sources of the doctrine."t 2 Arguments that the statute's language fails to
support or precludes the doctrine have not fared well even when courts have
not applied it; recognition that the doctrine is in haec verba with Title VII has
precluded that particular argument. 313
1. Legislative Purpose. Much of the legislative history of the ADEA focused
on the older breadwinner who had been discharged and found himself
physiologically, psychologically, and financially debilitated because of his
unemployment. The displaced homemaker is likewise "discharged." She can
no longer remain in the position that she has held over the years and she too
suffers physiological, psychological, and financial disaster. Her financial,
educational, and emotional resources often are more limited than those of her
counterpart who has been employed recently outside the home.' 14 Instead of
unemployment compensation, welfare assistance is often her only alternative,
and then only if she has children living at home who are under the age of
eighteen.'i 5 The costs to society and to the individual are high in terms of
money and human resources and the ADEA's objective of having employment
decisions made on the basis of real rather than illusory factors is not met.
2. The Nature of Age Discrimination and the Source of the Disparate Impact Doctrine.
The discrimination that the displaced homemaker suffers, like age
discrimination in general, is not based on bigotry, but rather on the
stereotype that a woman has no skills if she has not worked outside the home.
Because her experience is not often evaluated in terms of what is involved in
performing individual tasks, there is an assumption that she does not possess
the requisite skills for a particular job. Her disadvantage is akin to the
disadvantage many minorities suffer when employers evaluate characteristics
that result from prior societal actions and use them to distinguish applicants
or workers from persons who have not been subject to placement in those
same societal roles.
As indicated above, some courts and commentators would have the
disparate impact doctrine apply only to Griggs-type situations involving a
history of discrimination against the protected class by either the employer,
the industry, or society, as well as facially neutral criteria that serve to
perpetuate the effects of that past discrimination.'16 Under such a view,
displaced homemakers might still be entitled to use the disparate impact
112. See supra text accompanying notes 65-82.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
114. SUBCOMM. ON RETIREMENT INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE SELECT HOUSE COMM. ON
AGING, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., WOMEN IN MIDLIFE-SECURITY AND FULFILLMENT (PART 1) 86 (Comm.
Print 1978).
115. Id. at 90.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 76-82.
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doctrine since, as noted above, the general nature of the discrimination can be
said to parallel the situation described in Griggs. 117 Even if courts are not
inclined to accept that analogy and apply the doctrine, the displaced
homemaker should be able to recover under the disparate treatment doctrine
with thorough documentation of her experience and skills.
B. Disparate Treatment and the Displaced Homemaker
Use of the McDonnell Douglas disparate treatment doctrine in an ADEA
action brought by a displaced homemaker requires that she claim that she is a
member of the protected class, that she applied for the job and was rejected,
and that after the rejection, the employer continued to seek applicants for the
job."" She could also establish a prima facie case using statistical
information, direct evidence of discrimination, or circumstantial evidence
other than that used in the McDonnell Douglas test.' 19 Although the burden of
proof remains with the plaintiff once she establishes a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for the decision not to hire.' 20
For the displaced homemaker, the stumbling block is the same as with the
disparate impact doctrine. She might claim to be qualified, based on her own
assessment of her experience in uncompensated jobs, although the employer
will most likely cite lack of experience as the nondiscriminatory reason for the
decision. Even if the employer's claim is lack of any experience rather than the
lack of documented experience, in the absence of credible evidence that
plaintiff's uncompensated experience is valuable in the context of the job
sought, there is some likelihood that the employer's defense will prevail.
C. Establishing the Qualifications of the Displaced Homemaker
Section 3(a) of the ADEA, captioned Education and Research Program,
directed the Secretary of Labor to "undertake studies and provide
information to labor unions, management, and the general public concerning
the needs and abilities of older workers, and their potentials for continued
employment and contribution to the economy," and suggested at least four
means of accomplishing this directive. 12
117. Id.
118. McDonnell Douglas Co. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
119. Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983).
120. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 622(a) (1982). The four means are listed as follows:
(1) undertake research, and promote research, with a view to reducing barriers to the
employment of older persons, and the promotion of measures for utilizing their skills;
(2) publish and otherwise make available to employers, professional societies, the various
media of communication, and other interested persons the findings of studies and other
materials for the promotion of employment;
(3) foster through the public employment service system and through cooperative effort the
development of facilities of public and private agencies for expanding the opportunities and
potentials of older persons; and
(4) sponsor and assist State and community informational and educational programs.
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It is not clear that any information produced as a result of the ADEA's
directive has addressed misconceptions about the abilities of the displaced
homemaker. Although the abilities of a displaced homemaker job applicant
will vary with the applicant, as do the abilities of any person applying for ajob,
information is available that could serve as the basis for evaluation of the skills
used in homemaking tasks.' 22 In addition, displaced homemakers would be
encouraged to set forth their credentials in a manner capable of assessment if
there was some indication that potential employers would seriously consider
them. Widespread dissemination of research and information by the
Department of Labor or by other private and public entities could alert
potential employers to methods for evaluating such experience. Such a
technique might provide courts and plaintiffs with information providing a
basis for judicial notice for establishment of a prima facie case of disparate
treatment that could not easily be rebutted by a claim of lack of experience.
Recent efforts to obtain equitable distribution of a couple's assets upon
their divorce could be helpful in evaluating work traditionally done by
displaced homemakers. Just as employers consider a veteran's time in military
service when determining years of job experience, an employer could, if
presented with sufficient evidence, determine even more accurately the
equivalent value of a homemaker's experience.
One case recognizing the "equitable distribution" theory relied heavily on
the expert testimony of an employment specialist who established
requirements of each job category that the divorcing wife had assumed during
her marriage, the preliminary hourly wage for each job listed, and the total
weekly salary for her work. 123 The value established for the homemaking
services was $41,277.08.124 The expert then evaluated the services performed
by an executive housekeeper and equated those to a junior level management
position.'2 5 Using wage scales reported by the United States Wage and Salary
Administration, he was able to figure compensation for those functions as well
as the value of Social Security contributions for that position.' 26 After
testimony about the role of the executive wife and the fitness of the wife in
question for that position, he was asked about her employability at age fifty-
nine with only a high school education and documented work experience as a
secretary more than thirty years before. 127
122. See generally M. MINroN &J. BLOCK, WHAT IS A WIFE WORTH? (1983).
123. Gallagher v. Gallagher (Ill. Cook County Cir. Ct.) (unreported case discussed in M. MINroN
&J. BLOCK, supra note 122, at 53-80), affid, 60 Ill. App. 3d. 26, 376 N.E. 2d 279 (1978).
124. Id. at 76.
Undoubtedly economists would argue that this number is inflated since if homemaking were a
compensated activity the labor force wishing to participate in the activity would increase, thereby
decreasing the cost of the labor. By the same token, however, sociologists might argue that the
worth assessed is not accurate in that women seem to assume some of these duties regardless of the
cost-benefit ratio involved. Whether the figures arrived at can be said to be the true economic or
sociological value of the work, they are figures that have some basis in fact and can constitute a point
from which evaluations can be made.
125. Gallagher, reviewed by M. MINTON & J. BLOCK, supra note 123, at 76.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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My opinion is that she is unemployable at the present and in the future because of the
standard hiring practice in the labor market. The individual has no ascertainable
skills, no work history, no letters of recommendation. The company's group benefits
such as medical and life insurance would be expensive to extend to such an individual.
Even if she had a fair amount of clerical skills, the job market would be limited and
almost nonexistent. Employer profitability would be minimal in that this individual is
at the bottom of the pyramid when rating each category of qualifications.1 28
Although the equitable distribution cases are only concerned with the
division of assets on divorce or separation, they provide a basis for classifying
the jobs of a homemaker and therefore for evaluation of a particular job
applicant's work experience. Because employers often do not delve into the
quality of the job experience for any applicant, but rather simply verify
employment or military service, a simple listing could provide the basis for
equitable evaluation of the professional experience of displaced homemakers.
Where specific recommendations are required, they should be available for
volunteer activities outside the home, and may even be obtainable from
outside observers for jobs associated with housekeeping and child care.
This discussion assumes that employers will be willing to take into account
or courts will mandate the recognition of the factors set forth above. Some
states have done so by equitable distribution statutes. 129 Others have been
less willing. In one recent case in which a displaced homemaker sought
unemployment benefits because of her inability to find work after a divorce
from her university faculty husband, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected her
claim that she had performed what were in essence employment services for




Although the federal appellate courts that have considered the question
have agreed that claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
require only proof of disparate impact, Justice Rehnquist, the only Supreme
Court Justice to speak to the issue, has maintained that ADEA claims require
more. Some lower federal courts and some legal writers have agreed with
Justice Rehnquist's position.
Congressional attention to the plight of displaced homemakers has shown
that the homemakers are less able than other persons similarly situated to
compete for first-time employment outside the home and that the difficulty is
directly and indirectly attributable to their age and gender. Despite the
recognition that a homemaker's services are essential for the orderly
functioning of society, an argument can be made that the age and gender
distinctions are based on personal choices made by these women to forgo
128. Id.
129. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c)(1) (1981); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5),(7)
(McKINNEY 1984).
130. Curtis v. Idaho Dep't of Employment, 107 Idaho 956, 695 P.2d 341 (1985).
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employment outside the home in favor of uncompensated work. There is also
an argument, however, that these women have developed measurable skills
that are not taken into account or are discounted when they apply for paid
employment.
It is much easier to prove the discriminatory impact of this discounting on
older women than it would be to prove discriminatory treatment. Under the
disparate treatment doctrine, a displaced homemaker would have to combat
the argument that her lack of paid employment experience was a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason for an employer's refusal to hire her. The
development of means by which an employer could assess skills gained
through volunteer work or other unpaid work outside the home could help
defeat such an argument.
A recent federal district court case involving a woman who had been
employed, but dropped out of the full-time labor force for a period, found
that use of a "recency" factor to rate that employee's application for
employment had a discriminatory impact on older women, and that such
discrimination was based on both age and gender. 13 1 The rationale the court
adopted in that case is applicable to displaced homemakers.
Education of employers and potential employees of the value of work that
traditionally has been accorded no value, and some means to assess that
value, could help employers and displaced homemakers avoid the necessity of
bringing ADEA or Title VII suits to test this theory, or alternatively could
serve as the basis for proof in actions that might be brought. Section 3(a) of
the ADEA directed the Secretary of Labor to undertake studies and provide
information to labor unions, management, and the general public about the
needs and abilities of older workers. Wider distribution of available
information about displaced homemakers and the work of homemakers
generally, even without new studies, could provide the education necessary.
131. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
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